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INTRODUCTION

Students engaged in the study of federal income taxation routinely
examine the case of Farid-es-Sultanehv. Commissioner,' in which the Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed a wife's tax basis in stock she
received under the terms of an antenuptial agreement. While the case
invariably engenders a lively and engaging class discussion, the black letter
law ultimately is straightforward: her basis equaled the fair market value of
the shares on the date they were received because they were acquired for
consideration (that being the release of marital rights in her future husband's
property). The government had argued that her basis was the same as her
husband's (a carryover basis) because she received the stock as a gift.
Perhaps students' enthusiasm for the case results from a sense that
they simply do not know the full story. After all, why would an engaged
woman accept stock worth $787,5002 in exchange for the possibility of
receiving over $33 million upon her husband's death - particularly when
her fianc6 was twenty-five years her senior with a life expectancy of only4
3
sixteen and one-half years? The recital of facts in the court's opinion
reflects that the marriage was brief and, one might suspect, tumultuous.
Students are also confused by the case name: how did an American citizen
end up as Farid-Es-Sultaneh? Alas, neither the trial court nor the Court of
Appeals betrayed even the slightest interest in the taxpayer's motives or the
details underlying what surely must have been a titillating tale.

1. 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947) (FaridI]), rev'd, 6 T.C. 652 (1946) (Farid
).

2. This figure was computed by multiplying the number of shares received
(2,500) by the fair market value per share on April, 24, 1924 (as stated in the Court
of Appeals opinion). Farid II, 160 F.2d at 813; see also Stipulation of Facts I ,
Farid 1, 6 T.C. 652 (No. 2968). For the significance of this particular date, see infra
text accompanying notes 17-19.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 23-27.
4. The facts stated in the Tax Court's opinion are brief. See Fard1, 6 T.C.
at 652. The facts recited by the appellate court, however, present a fuller account.
See Farid1, 160 F.2d at 813-14.

2013]

About Farid

This Article reflects the results of a research expedition into the
journalistic past and offers the real account.5 As one might suspect, the story
would merit front-page coverage in celebrity gossip magazines if it occurred
in modem times, involving as it did fame, wealth, serial separation and
reconciliation, and sundry allegations of gold digging and infidelity.
Surprisingly, the real story is not reflected in the facts set forth in either the
trial or appellate court decision. Indeed, had the real facts been placed in
issue, the case might well have been decided for the government. This
discrepancy raises thought-provoking and important questions about the role
of fact development in litigation and fact finding in the judicial process. This
Article explores the impact, both in this case and generally, of litigating on
the basis of "facts" that are not true, the strategic decisions that lawyers make
in developing facts, and the ethical considerations implicated in framing a
story.
This Article begins by describing the facts as they were found and
relied upon by the courts in Farid. It then recounts another version - the
true story - and considers whether the real facts might have occasioned a
different result, concluding that the correct facts would have produced a win
for the government and a carryover basis. Indeed, Faridis a model case for
6
the notion that everything in law revolves around facts. How a story is told
or how a fact finder understands a series of facts guides the court's ruling as
much as a judge's understanding of applicable law.7 This Article speculates
on the motives of counsel in the case for both sides in stipulating to facts that
were untrue and concludes that some strategic advantage probably induced
them to agree to the facts as we have come to know them over the years.
Finally, this Article ruminates on lessons taught by Farid in the context of
substantive tax law, litigation strategy generally, and ethical considerations.
An epilogue provides curious readers with the rest of the Farid story; while
irrelevant to the legal issue in the Farid litigation, the tale of Farid's life is
both fascinating and extraordinary.

5. The story presented here is as real or true as the press reports of the day.
The facts related herein, other than those explicitly referred to as derived from
judicial opinions, are based exclusively on contemporaneous newspaper articles.
6. STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL
LAWYERING SKILLS 11 (4th ed. 2011) ("The analysis of facts permeates this
[important] book because the analysis of facts permeates the practice of law.").
7. Id. at 188; see generally id. at 131-40, 177-80.
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THE FACTS ACCORDING TO THE COURTS

Because the case was fully stipulated, the pertinent facts were never
in dispute.8 The lower court (United States Tax Court), therefore, was not
called upon to find facts based on evidence presented but merely adopted
verbatim the stipulations crafted and agreed upon by lawyers for the
government and for the taxpayer. Whereas the Tax Court's recital of the facts
was brief, the Court of Appeals' extended account is fully consistent with the
Stipulation of Facts submitted to the Tax Court. 9
The taxpayer, Doris Farid-es-Sultaneh ("Doris"), 10 was an American
citizen who sold shares of common stock in S.S. Kresge Company in 1938
for $230,802.36." Doris had acquired the shares from her ex-husband, S.S.

Kresge

("S.S.,,). 12

In December 1923, when S.S. was married to another

woman and Doris was unmarried, he delivered 700 shares to her; these
shares had a fair market value of $290 per share.' 3 The shares were to be held
by Doris "'for her benefit and protection in the event that the said Kresge
should die prior to the contemplated marriage between the petitioner [Doris]
and said Kresge."" 4 S.S. divorced his first wife on January 9, 1924 and, on
or about January 23, 1924, he delivered another 1,800 shares to Doris, these

8. Farid11, 160 F.2d 812, 813 (2d Cir. 1947); see also Faridl,6 T.C. 652
(1946). Most Tax Court cases are tried on stipulated facts; live testimony is rare.
JANE C. BERGNER, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 50.90 (2012).
Current Tax Court Rule 91 sets out a mandatory pretrial stipulation procedure
covering, inter alia, factual matters that are not in dispute. TAX CT. R. 91(a). A
stipulation is treated as a conclusive admission of a party but only for purposes of
the pending litigation. TAX CT. R. 91(e); Borchers v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 82, 90
(1990), affd, 943 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1991) (stipulated facts are treated in the same
manner as facts found by the court on the basis of evidence presented at trial). Why
the parties in Farid I might have acquiesced in the particular facts in the case is
considered later in this article. See infra Part III.
9. See Stipulation of Facts, supra note 2.
10. The taxpayer was known as "Doris" through most of her life. See infra
note 31 and accompanying text.
11. To get a sense of size of the transaction, the amount realized on the sale
in 1938, $230,802, is equivalent to $3,756,310.73 in 2012 U.S. dollars. CPI Inflation
Calculator, U.S. BOARD OF LABOR AND STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/cgibin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Jul. 25, 2012).
12. Mr. Kresge was known as "S.S." S.S. Kresge Dead; Merchant was 99,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1966, at 1.

13. Farid 11, 160 F.2d at 813; see also Farid 1, 6 T.C. at 652. The
Stipulation of Facts states that the value of this stock was $280 per share. Stipulation
of Facts, supra note 2, 2.
14. FaridII, 160 F.2d at 813 (quoting from the Stipulation of Facts 2,
Farid-es-Sultanehv. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 652 (1946) (No. 2968)).

About Farid

2013]

to be held for the same
purpose as the first 700 shares.' 5 No value was stated
6
shares.'
1,800
the
for
On April 24, 1924, Doris and S.S. executed an antenuptial agreement
in which:
she acknowledged the receipt of the shares "as a gift by the
said Sebastian S. Kresge, pursuant to this indenture, and, as
an ante-nuptial settlement, and in consideration of said gift
and said ante-nuptial settlement, in consideration of the
promise of said Sebastian S. Kresge to marry her, and in
further consideration of the consummation of said promised
marriage" she released all dower and other marital rights,
including the right to her support to which she otherwise
would have been entitled as a matter of law when she
became his wife. 7
The couple married "immediately after the ante-nuptial agreement was
executed."' 8 The value of the stock on April 24, 1924 was $315 per share and
rose to $330 per share on May 6, 1924, when the shares were transferred to
Doris on the corporation's books.' 9
Doris and S.S. divorced on May 18, 1928. Doris claimed no
alimony, and none was awarded to her.20 Because of a series of stock
dividends over the years, Doris's adjusted basis per share in 1938 (the year at
issue) was $10.66% per share computed on the basis of the fair market value

15. Id.; see also Faridl,6 T.C. at 652.
16. The Stipulation of Facts states that the value of this stock was $290 per
share. Stipulation of Facts, supra note 2, 2.
17. Farid 1,160 F.2d at 813. The language within the quotation marks is
from the aritenuptial agreement. See Stipulation of Facts, supra note 2, at Exhibit 1A. The Stipulation of Facts states that the 2,500 shares referred to in the agreement
were the same shares previously received by Doris in December 1923 and January
1924. Id. 3. The alternative version of facts reflects that Doris believed she was
going to receive 2,500 additional shares under the agreement. See infra notes 52-62
and accompanying text.
18. Farid11, 160 F.2d at 813; see also Faridl, 6 T.C. at 652.
19. Farid11, 160 F.2d at 813.

20. Id.
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2
per share at "the time" of her acquisition,
1 and $0.159091 computed as a
22
basis.
carryover of S.S.'s adjusted
The Court of Appeals' recital of facts concluded by noting the
couple's ages and life expectancies as of the date of their marriage 23 and the
value of S.S.'s wealth. Doris was thirty-two years old with a life expectancy
of thirty-three and three-fourths years (i.e., sixty-five and three-fourths
years). 24 S.S. was fifty-seven years old with a life expectancy of sixteen and
one-half years (i.e., seventy-three and one-half years). 25 He was then worth

approximately $375,000,00026 and owned real estate worth approximately
$100,000,000.27

Il1.

THE TRUE STORY

Before recounting the alternative version of Doris's story, a brief
synopsis of her life and of S.S.'s life, prior to their marriage, is provided
here.
A.

Before They Met: Doris

The future Mrs. Kresge began life as Mabel Doris Mercer. 28 She was
born in 1889 to Captain George A. Mercer, reported variously as a Pittsburgh
police captain, a Superintendent of Buildings in Allegheny, Pennsylvania,2 9
and as a partner of Andrew Carnegie. 30 By the time Ms. Mercer
applied for a
31
use.
from
"Mabel"
dropped
had
she
S.S.,
marry
to
license

21. Id. According to the Stipulation of Facts, the value per share on April
24, 1924 was $14 per share, but Doris used $10.66% per share as her adjusted basis.
Stipulation of Facts, supra note 2, 11-12. The discrepancy is not explained.
22. Farid11, 160 F.2d at 813. It is unclear what date the court referred to as
"the time" of Doris's acquisition since she received the shares in two blocks, on two
dates, and the corporation recorded her ownership on a third date.
23. See Stipulation of Facts, supra note 2, 15 (reflecting life expectancies
on April 24, 1924, the date of the marriage).
24. Farid1l, 160 F.2d at 814.
25. Id. at 813.
26. $375,000,000 in 1924 is worth $5,032,412281 in 2012. CPI Inflation
Calculator,supra note 11.

27. Farid 11, 160 F.2d at 813. $100,000,000

in 1924 is worth

$1,343,197,661 in 2012. CPI Inflation Calculator,supra note 11.
28. P.L. Harden Weddedto Mabel Mercer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1911, at 3.

29. Id
30. From the Magazine, TIME, May 5, 1924.
31. See S.S. Kresge Obtains License Here to Wed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,

1924, at 9 (license issued to S.S. Kresge and Doris Mercer).
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At the age of 17, Doris became engaged to Carl Borntraeger, a ward
of industrialist Henry C. Frick.32 Neither Captain Mercer nor Mr. Frick was
pleased with the relationship. There reportedly was a scene, and as a result,
Doris ran away to New York City to pursue a life on the stage. She landed a
minor role on Broadway in a musical comedy, Earl and the Girl.
Displeased, Captain Mercer tricked his daughter into taking a trip home to
Pennsylvania. Once over the state line, Captain Mercer confined his daughter
against her will in the Episcopalian Country Home in Germantown.33 Within
a month, Doris and Carl implemented an escape plan worthy of a B movie,
involving a seemingly secure second floor window, a linen sheet, a mad
slide, and a fall to the ground. The couple returned to New York City but
never married.34
In 1911, Doris married Percival L. Harden, publisher of The Club
Fellow, a weekly gossip newspaper - also known to some as a "reputation
monger ' ,35 and as a "tattle magazine, 36 published in New York and
Chicago. It was Mr. Harden's second marriage, his first having ended in
divorce. However, his second marriage soon met the same fate as the first
and ended in 1918. After Harden's death in 1930, Doris is reported to have
said: "My first husband was a delightful, worldly man. He was charming not
only to me but 3unfortunately
to every other woman he met. Naturally, that
8
was unsettling."
B.

Before They Met: S.S.

Sebastian Kresge is best remembered as the founder of S.S. Kresge
Company (the "Company"). At the time of his death in 1966,39 the Company

32. Interestingly, Doris and Frick are buried in the same cemetery Homewood Cemetery in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Other notable "inhabitants"
include ketchup magnate H.J. Heinz II, former U.S. Senator H.J. Heinz IIl, and
Baseball Hall of Famer Pie Traynor. Homewood Cemetery, FIND A GRAVE,
http://www.findagrave.com/php/famous.php?page=cem&FScemeteryid=45139 (last
visited Aug. 7, 2012); Homewood Cemetery, JANIE & TIM (Aug. 14, 2011),
http://janieandtim.com/?p=627 (photographs of notable graves).
33. S.S. Kresge WedAgain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1924, at 20.
34. P.L. Harden Wedded to Mabel Mercer, supra note 28, at 3.
35. National Affairs: Jardines,TIME, Aug. 23, 1926, at 11.
36. The Press: So Many of Them, TIME, Apr. 21, 1930, at 28.
37. Third Wife Sues Harden, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1926, at 10.
38. The Press: End of a Gossipist, TIME, Apr. 28, 1930, at 29. Mr. Harden
took his own life in a New York hotel room. Harden, Publisher,Ends Life by Shot,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1930, at 24.

39. Despite a life expectancy, in 1947, of sixteen and one-half years when
he was fifty-seven years old, S.S. lived to be 99. Farid i, 160 F.2d 812, 813 (2d Cir.
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owned 930 stores throughout the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico 670 Kresge variety ("5-and-10-cent") stores, 150 Kmart department stores,
and 110 Jupiter discount stores. 40 S.S. is also remembered as a generous
philanthropist, primarily through the Kresge Foundation, which he
established in 1924 - coincidentally the same year in which he divorced his
first wife and married Doris - through an initial contribution of $1.3 million
and which made grants of $70 million during his lifetime.4'
S.S. was born in 1867 on a farm in Bald Mountain, Pennsylvania. As
a young man he worked as a traveling salesman. One customer who
particularly impressed S.S. was Frank Woolworth, who had founded a 5-and10-cent store chain several years earlier. Resolving to enter that same
business, S.S. went into partnership with John G. McCrory, becoming a halfowner of a 5-and-10-cent store in Memphis and another in Detroit. The
partners eventually split, with each partner taking full ownership of one
store. S.S. became sole owner of the Detroit42 emporium and soon began
opening Kresge stores throughout the Midwest.
The Company went public in 1912. S.S served as President from
1907 to 1925 and as Chairman of the Board from 1913 until shortly before
his death. In 1925, when S.S. left the presidency, the Company operated 307
stores. That same year, S.S. purchased a large interest in Stern Brothers, a
New York department store, and smaller interests in The Fair, a Chicago
department store that eventually became part of Montgomery Ward & Co.,
and Kresge Newark, Inc., a Newark department store that later became
Chase Newark Store. S.S. also was President for many years of the Kresge
Realty Company.43 S.S. resided in Detroit from 1899 until he moved to New
York City in 1924. 44
C.

The FirstDivorce

Although S.S.'s courtship of Doris began while Kresge was married
to another woman, the ground for divorce alleged by the first Mrs. Kresge
1947). He died in 1966, outliving Doris by more than three years. See infra notes
258-60 and accompanying text.
40. S.S. Kresge Dead; Merchant was 99, supra note 12, at I. Annual sales
exceeded $851 million in 1965, when the company employed 42,000 people. Id at
38.
41. S.S. Kresge Dead; Merchant was 99, supra note 12, at 38.
42. Id. Mr. McCrory's collection of stores grew as well. In 1987, McCrory

stores bought all of the Kresge stores that were still operating. Isadore Barmash, A
Kresge-McCrory Reunion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1987, at 33. For a history of the
McCrory businesses, see ISADORE BARMASH, FOR THE GOOD OF THE COMPANY:
WORK AND INTERPLAY IN A MAJOR AMERICAN CORPORATION

(1976).

43. Barmash, A Kresge-McCrory Reunion, supra note 42, at 33.

44. Id.
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was cruelty, not adultery. 45 Her divorce pleadings never mentioned another
woman but instead described her husband as "frequently sullen and
morose, ' 46 with a "moody disposition and temperament, '4 7 refusing to speak
to her or their children for days at a time. He was a "nagger" and a "scolder,"
she alleged, who refused to accept responsibility for his children. 48 The
couple had five children, two of whom were minors at the time of the
divorce. Their oldest son, Stanley, was already working with his father at the
time. 49 The divorce settlement reportedly was $10,000,000.50
D.

The Second Marriage and Doris's Acquisition ofShares

S.S. and Doris married in New York on April 24, 1924. 5' A year
later, the couple was in court. Doris sued S.S. seeking 17,500 shares of
Company stock, which she asserted he had promised her before their
marriage as a settlement in lieu of her dower rights. News reports at the
time valued her claim at $7,000,000. 53 The complaint alleged that the couple
had reached an oral agreement, that S.S. was supposed to have had a written
agreement drawn up to reflect the terms of that agreement, but that the
document ultimately drafted and signed reflected only 2,500 shares. 54 (This
document is the same agreement referred to in the later tax case). Doris
further alleged that her husband had caused her to sign the antenuptial
agreement "by persuasion, artifice, and fraud. 55 In this regard, it may be
noted that both Farid opinions indicated that the agreement was signed
45. S.S. Kresge Obtains License Here to Wed, supra note 31, at 9.
46. Id.; see also Wife of Kresge Gets Divorce on Cruelty Charge, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 12, 1924, at 2.
47. Kresge Trial Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1923, at 6.
48. Id.
49. See STANLEY S. KRESGE, THE S.S. KRESGE STORY, 24-25 (1979)
(Stanley worked at a Detroit Kresge store during school vacations, became a
manager-trainee in 1923, and then managed several 5-and-10-cent stores before
joining the Company's headquarters staff in 1930). Stanley became Chairman of the
Board when his father stepped down many years later but retired a year later.
Sebastian S. Kresge, 98, Quits as Head of Chain He Founded, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 22,
1966, at 63; Stanley Sebastian Kresge, 85, Retailer and Philanthropist, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 3, 1985, at D19.
50. Wife Sues Kresge for $7,000,000 Stock, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1925, at 1.
Mrs. Kresge was given sole possession of "the palatial Kresge residence" in Detroit.
Wife of Kresge Gets Divorce on Cruelty Charge, supra note 46, at 2.
51. S.S. Kresge Wed Again, supra note 33, at 20.
52. Wife Sues Kresge for $7,000,000 Stock, supra note 50, at 1.
53. Id.; Mrs. Kresge Reduces Claim to $1,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
1925, at 21.
54. Wife Sues Kresge for $7,000,000 Stock, supra note 50, at 1.
55. Id.
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immediately before the wedding ceremony.56 One can speculate on the
pressure the bride might have been under at that time. The complaint also
alleged that Mr. Kresge
had failed to deliver even the 2,500 shares referred to
57
in the agreement.
Doris's lawyer told reporters that S.S. had promised to transfer the
shares by May 1, 1925 and, having failed to make any such transfers, had
shortly thereafter moved out of the couple's58 home. He intimated that a
separate matrimonial action would be brought.
For reasons now unknown, Doris hired a new lawyer, who amended
the original complaint to demand only the transfer of the 2,500 shares
mentioned in the antenuptial agreement. 59 Doris's attorney claimed that the
2,500 shares, together with a stock dividend of 1,250, were worth
$2,000,000.60 The reason for the reduced demand is unclear. One might
speculate, however, that the new attorney understood the statute of frauds,
under which certain contracts, including contracts
in consideration of
61
writing.
in
unless
unenforceable
are
marriage,
In his opening statement at trial, Doris's lawyer told the following
story. The couple met in January 1921, and "a friendship between them had
developed in March. 62 Doris was then studying music, and Mr. Kresge
asked her how much her studies would cost to complete. She replied
"$10,000," whereupon S.S. opened a brokerage account for her and
deposited sufficient securities to provide Doris with that amount. When S.S.
closed the account in 1923, it had provided Doris with $145,000 in income.
S.S. had promised to replace the account with 2,500 shares of Company
stock but instead offered Doris 2,000 shares in Kresge Department Store.
Doris declined the offer in favor of shares in the publicly-traded Company.
S.S. immediately transferred 700 Company shares to her and promised to
transfer 1,800 more at a later date, explaining that he was a married father of
five children and did not want to be associated with such a large gift to
woman who was not his wife. S.S. admonished Doris not to have the shares
transferred to her on the books of the Company because he wished the gift to
be kept secret. Once S.S.'s divorce was finalized, he urged a quick marriage
so that the couple would be husband and wife before news of their liaison

56. FaridIl,
160 F.2d 812, 813 (2d Cir. 1947); Farid1,6 T.C. 652 (1946).
57. Wife Sues Kresgefor $7,000,000 Stock, supra note 50, at 1.
58. Id
59. Mrs. Kresge Reduces Claim to $1,000,000, supra note 53, at 21.

60. Justice Paves Way for Kresge Reunion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1926, at 1.
61. See, e.g., Hunt v. Hunt, 64 N.E. 159 (N.Y. 1902); see also
124 (1981).
62. Justice Paves Way for Kresge Reunion, supra note 60, at 5. Unless

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

otherwise indicated, the descriptions of counsels' opening statements and quotes
therefrom are set forth in this article.
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reached the press. S.S. then asked for an antenuptial agreement that provided
Doris with 2,500 shares in addition to the 2,500 that she already owned.
S.S.'s account, as related in his attorney's opening statement,
differed from Doris's attorney's in several material respects. Most
importantly, defense counsel claimed there was only one block of 2,500
shares, the shares that were referred to in the antenuptial agreement. 63 While
asserting that these shares were not "a gift to cover up [S.S.'s] friendship for
[Doris] before their marriage," 64 S.S.'s lawyer did acknowledge that S.S. had
transferred the 2,500 shares to Doris prior to their wedding. 65 The latter
assertion is consistent with the Stipulation of Facts in Farid,which, while
referring to a single block of 2,500 shares, indicated that S.S. had delivered
all of those shares to Doris prior to execution of the antenuptial agreement
and the marriage.66
According to this lawyer's statement, Doris was to receive $10,000 a
year from S.S. for purposes of her music study. A brokerage account was set
up to provide her with that amount without "leav[ing] behind a trail of his
conduct., 67 S.S.'s lawyer claimed that Doris had received $205,000 from the
brokerage account before it was closed.68 As to the couple's relationship,
S.S.'s attorney conceded that his client "was attentive to Miss Mercer in a
Central Park West apartment" for which he paid all of the expenses. 69 "Their
friendship was most agreeable. She was nice to him, and there was no
70
question but that he was infatuated with her.,
Upon their engagement, which occurred after S.S.'s first wife asked
for a divorce but before that divorce became final, S.S. and Doris discussed
an antenuptial agreement. Counsel claimed that the possibility of putting
5,000 shares of Company stock in trust for Doris was discussed but that the
parties ultimately agreed on an outright transfer of 2,500 shares.71 Counsel
asserted that Doris "developed a strong affection for money" and that when
S.S. realized that "she was more fond of his stock and money than of
himself," he moved out of their apartment.7 2 At that time, he had already
transferred 700 shares to her. Doris apologized, S.S. moved back in and, "to

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Kresges Settle; Reunion Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1926, at 3; see
also Mrs. Kresge Put on 3 Year Trial as Dutiful Wife, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 1926, at
17.
66. Stipulation of Facts, supra note 2,
2-4.
67. Justice Paves Way for Kresge Reunion, supra note 60, at 5.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Justice Paves Way for Kresge Reunion, supra note 60, at 5.
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show his good intentions," S.S. transferred 1,800 more shares to Doris.73
Only then did the divorce from his first wife and the subsequent marriage to
Doris take place.
Doris's suit was settled after opening statements and before any
testimony was given.74 The couple did not announce the terms of their
settlement. Press accounts were inconsistent, 75 but at least one report
indicated that Doris received cash but no additional shares.76 Thus, the
question of whether S.S. had promised Doris one or two blocks of 2,500
shares was never publicly resolved.
While Doris's version of the facts differed in significant respects
from S.S.'s version, it is notable for purposes of this Article that Doris's
version also varied from the Stipulation of Facts to which she subsequently
agreed in the Tax Court. In litigation with S.S., Doris claimed there were two
blocks of 2,500 shares - the 2,500 shares she received prior to the marriage,
which were hers irrespective of the antenuptial agreement, and the 2,500
additional shares she was entitled to under that agreement in exchange for
releasing her marital property rights. In Tax Court, however, Doris agreed to
stipulations that referred only to a single block of 2,500 shares.77 Moreover,
the stipulations explicitly stated that the 2,500 shares Doris received prior to
the marriage were the same 2,500 shares referred to in the antenuptial
agreement. 78 Notably, the shares themselves were delivered to Doris, in
street name, prior to the wedding.
Hence, there are two possible versions of the facts: (1) the 2,500
shares that Doris received prior to her marriage were not the subject of the

73. Id
74. The matter was settled after the presiding judge urged the couple to seek
counsel from the minister of the church they attended. Kresges Settle; Reunion
Expected, supra note 65, at 3.
75. See, e.g., Reconciliation of Kresges Ends Legal Dispute,

CHI. TRIB.,

Mar. 20, 1926, at 3 (more than $1,000,000, of which $100,000 was in cash); Mrs.
Kresge Put on 3 Year Trial as Dutiful Wife, supra note 65, at 17 (financial settlement

contingent upon Doris being a "dutiful wife" for three years; paid out incrementally);
S.S. Kresge Reveals Settlement Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1926, at 21 (statement
of S.S. released by Doris's lawyer denying that settlement imposed any conditions
on Doris). In pleadings filed in a divorce action several years later, S.S. stated that he
had given Doris $100,000 to settle the suit. Mrs. Kresge Fights Husband'sSuit, N.Y.
TIMES,

Apr. 18, 1928, at 27.
76. ReconciliationofKresges Ends Legal Dispute, supra note 75, at 3.

77. Stipulation of Facts, supra note 2, 2-4.
78. Id 3 ("The twenty-five hundred (2,500) shares of stock referred to in
said agreement is the twenty-five hundred (2,500) shares referred to in paragraph 2
hereof."). Paragraph three goes on to state that Doris had not reported, for federal
income tax purposes, the receipt of the 2,500 shares in 1923 (the first 800) or in 1924
(the remaining 1,700). ld

A bout Farid

20131

antenuptial agreement, which contemplated an additional 2,500 shares; or (2)
there was only one block of 2,500 shares, and the antenuptial agreement
referred to shares that Doris already owned at the time the agreement was
executed. 79 Before considering the significance of the disparate accounts, one
might reasonably ask why Doris, indeed why both parties to the tax dispute,
agreed to seek a judicial determination based on facts that varied materially
from Doris's prior version of the story.
IV.

WHY WERE THE FACTS NOT THE FACTS?

Farid was decided on stipulated facts. In its present version, Tax
Court Rule 91 requires parties to stipulate facts "to the fullest extent to which
complete or qualified agreement can or fairly should be reached. 8 0 In 1945,
79. The language of the antenuptial agreement itself is susceptible of either
interpretation. In stating the reasons for the contact, the agreement speaks in the
future tense, stating that S.S. "desires to make provision for the immediate benefit
and protection of [Doris]." The operative clauses are worded in the present tense,
stating that S.S. "hereby gives, assigns, transfers, and sets over unto the said Doris
Mercer, absolutely Two Thousand five hundred (2,500) shares" and that Doris
"hereby acknowledges receipt from the said Sebastian S. Kresge of Two Thousand
five hundred (2,500) shares." Stipulation of Facts, supra note 2, at Exhibit 1-A.
80. TAX CT. R.. 91(a)(l). "Included in matters required to be stipulated are
all facts, all documents and papers or contents or aspects thereof, and all evidence
which fairly should not be in dispute." TAX CT. R. 91(a)(1).
The Tax Court has characterized the pretrial stipulation process as "the
bedrock of Tax Court practice." Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691, 692
(1974). According to the definitive history of the Tax Court, the stipulation
requirement is:
largely responsible for the court's ability to keep current with the
thousands of cases docketed each year. By eliminating the
necessity of proof at trial with respect to uncontroverted issues of
fact, pretrial stipulations result in savings of time and expense for
both the courts and the parties. Moreover, the necessity of
complying with the stipulation procedures forces opposing counsel
to consult and to develop the facts of their case in advance of trial.
As a result, issues are perceived and litigating risks are evaluated
at an early stage of the proceedings. Many observers believe that
the high rate of pretrial settlements that obtains in the Tax Court is
largely due to this fact of its practice.
HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

277 (1979)(citations omitted). Former Chief Judge Tannenwald listed the advantages
of the stipulation process as follows:
First, and perhaps foremost, the stipulation process will force
counsel to face the realities of the issues involved and, as a
consequence, will often encourage partial, if not complete,
settlement. Second, careful attention to the preparation of a
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when the Stipulation of Facts in Faridwas filed, stipulations were common
in the Tax Court, but the practice was not yet mandatory. 8 1 A stipulation
generally is treated as a conclusive admission by the parties to the stipulation
but is binding only in the pending case and not for any other purpose, nor can
it be used against any of the parties in any other case or proceeding.8 2 There
being no contested issues of fact, Doris and the government jointly moved
for a decision without trial8 3
The stipulations, and the court's findings of fact which incorporated
them, did not reflect Doris's earlier version of the circumstances under which
Doris received Company shares from S.S., raising the question of why the
parties' lawyers might have agreed to the stipulations. One possibility is that
counsel for one or both, most likely the government, did not know the true
facts. 84 Doris had received the shares more than twenty years prior to
commencement of the Tax Court proceeding and had been divorced from
S.S. for seventeen years. Another possibility is that taxpayer's counsel
wished to save his client from embarrassment. It is also possible that one or

stipulation of facts will enable the parties to state undisputed
subsidiary facts with a degree of precision that in many cases will
not be reflected in the oral testimony of witnesses with its inherent
uncertainties. Third, the more complete the stipulation of facts, the
less time will be required for the trial itself and the more
meaningful the trial will be. To the extent that written material is
stipulated, needless expenditure of time in marking exhibits and
offering them into evidence is avoided .... Finally, it is important
to note that gaps in the stipulation can cause an issue to be decided
against the party having the burden of proof.
Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., Tax Court Trials: An Updated View from the Bench, 47
TAX LAW. 587, 591 (1994). For an interesting discussion of practical
considerations in the stipulation process, see Robert R. Veach, Stipulating Facts in
Tax Court, 34 TAXES 669 (1956).
81. See DUBROFF, AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at 277-83.
82. TAx CT. R. 91 (e).
83. See TAx CT. R. 122(a).
84. Interestingly, the Internal Revenue Manual of today admonishes
government attorneys to stipulate only to facts they know to be true. I.R.M. 35.4.7.1;
see also I.R.M. 35.4.7.3 ("The initial draft [by the government attorney] should be
based upon the known facts and documents contained in the administrative file,
admissions contained in the pleadings, answers to informal or formal discovery,
requests for admissions, and other facts or documents secured during trial
preparation."). Had the government attorneys in Farid I been governed by today's
Manual, they might not have been able to agree to stipulate as they did in the case.
The antenuptial agreement does not refer to shares having been received by Doris
prior to the marriage. Moreover, the facts alleged in Doris's petition are consistent
with her position in the prior litigation with S.S. Amended Petition 5(D), Farid1, 6
T.C. 652 (1946) (No. 2968).
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both parties assumed a strategic advantage from the facts as stipulated. It is
85
impossible to know.
A.

Why the Government Might Have Agreed to the StipulatedFacts

Perhaps the government was willing to accept the stipulation because
it believed in the strength of judicial precedent, which it regarded as
endorsing its position. 6 In retrospect, this was a poor decision, but, at the
time, the government's confidence was probably justified.
Indeed, the
government won in the Tax Court; the portion of the Tax Court's opinion
discussing the law and its application of the facts at bar took up only one
sentence. The court merely cited two Supreme Court decisions that it
85. The applicable rules of lawyers' ethics at the time were the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908). (The Canons
were adopted by the New York State Bar Association in 1909. Robert T. Begg,
Revoking the Lawyers' License to Discriminate in New York: The Demise of a
TraditionalProfessionalPrerogative,7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 275, 283 n.36 (1993)
(citing 32 Report of N.Y. State Bar Ass'n 167 (1909)). Unlike present day rules, the
Canons were brief (forty numbered paragraphs) and general in nature. Canon 22
("Candor and Fairness") stated in part: "It is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal
other than candidly with the facts in taking the statements of witnesses, in drawing
affidavits and other documents, and in the presentation of causes." CANONS OF
PROF'L ETHICS Canon 22. In contrast, today's rule, ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.3, is quite specific, stating in part:
A lawyer shall not knowingly: (I) make a false statement of fact or
law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact
or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; . . . or (3)
offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the
lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered
material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2012). New York adopted its version of
the Model Rules in 2009, http://www.nysba.org/ContentfNavigationMenu/For
Attorneys/ProfessionalStandardsforAttomeys/Professional_StandardsforAttomeys/
ProfessionalStandar.htm. Thus, if the stipulation had been submitted under the
current rules, one could reasonably infer that counsel was not aware that the
stipulation was at odds with Doris's prior version of the facts. One cannot reach the
same conclusion under the Canons. Of course, it is possible, in either case, that
Doris's prior version was false (i.e., that there was only one block of 2,500 shares)
and that the stipulation is accurate.
86. Today's Internal Revenue Manual prohibits IRS attorneys from
agreeing to stipulations of facts not known to be true, even if they believe that
particular facts are irrelevant. I.R.M. 35.4.7.4. Facts that are known to be true may
be stipulated to at the request of taxpayer's counsel, however, even if IRS attorneys
believe that the particular facts are irrelevant. Id.
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regarded as directly on point: The determination of the Commissioner is
approved upon the authority of Wemyss v. Commissioner, 234 U.S. 303, and
Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308.87 Wemyss and Merrill both were decided less

than eleven months before the government filed its brief in Faridand a mere
thirteen months (to the day) before the Tax Court rendered its decision. 88
Wemyss involved a transfer of stock by Mr. Wemyss to his fianc6e,
Mrs. More, a widow, prior to their marriage. The transfer was prompted by
Mrs. More's concern that her interests in two trusts created by her deceased
husband would cease upon her remarriage. The shares transferred to her by
Mr. Wemyss would compensate for her loss of income under the trusts. The
couple married within a month after the shares were transferred.
Rejecting the taxpayer's arguments that Mrs. More had given
consideration in the form of the marriage and that the transfer compensated
her for income she would have lost under the trusts, the Supreme Court held
that the entire value of the shares was a gift subject to federal gift tax." The
Court found that consideration in the common law sense is irrelevant under
the gift tax statute, which provided that "[w]here property is transferred for
less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, then
the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the
consideration shall, for the purpose of the tax imposed by this title, be
deemed a gift." 90 Thus, consideration not reducible to a money value, such as
love and affection, a promise of marriage, etc., is disregarded for gift tax
purposes. 9 1 The Court also reasoned that consideration must benefit the
transferor (donor) in order to afford relief from the gift tax (i.e., the
consideration must be received by the donor, not merely given or given up
by the donee).92
Merrill, a companion case to Wemyss, concerned an antenuptial
agreement between a man of substantial means and his fianc6e, Miss
Desmare, whose assets were "negligible." 93 Pursuant to the agreement, Mr.
Merrill agreed, within ninety days after the marriage to establish an
irrevocable trust for his new wife and to provide in his will for two additional
trusts for the benefit of his wife and their surviving children. In return, Miss
Desmare released all rights she might acquire as wife or widow in her

87. Farid 1, 6 T.C. 652, 653 (1946).). The Tax Court's opinion was only
four paragraphs long.
88. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
89. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
90. Id.at 306-07 (quoting Revenue Act of 1932, § 503, 47 Stat. 169, 247
(1932) (current version at I.R.C. § 2512(b))).
91. Id.
at 305.
92. Id.
at 307-08.
93. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 309 (1945).
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husband's property except the right to maintenance and support. The parties
married, and the terms of the agreement were carried out.
As in Wemyss, the Court in Merrill focused on the question of
whether there had been "adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth.

94

Reviewing the legislative history of the phrase in the

context of the estate tax, the Court concluded that "adequate and full
consideration" excludes relinquishment of dower and marital rights for both
estate and gift tax purposes.95
Wemyss and Merrill were decided on March 5, 1945. The
government filed its trial brief in Faridon February 26, 1946,96 and the Tax
Court issued its decision on April 5, 1946.97 Although the Tax Court briefs
are no longer available, a transcript of oral arguments before the Tax Court
reflects that the government's argument was straightforward: the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Wemyss and Merrill should apply to the facts in Farid.98
With the exception of one paragraph, the government's argument in its brief
on appeal to the Second Circuit was the same:
... that the present case is governed and the issue herein is

resolved by the rules laid down by the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, and Merrill v.

Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, upon the authority of which the Tax
Court sustained the Commissioner's determination herein. 99
Thus, it is likely that the government was willing to accept the
taxpayer's version of the facts - reflecting a quid pro quo exchange of
dower and marital rights for Company shares because it believed that those
facts would support a holding in its favor under the reasoning of Wemyss and
Merrill. It must have been a great surprise to the government that the Court
of Appeals did not regard the income tax as subject to the same standards, 00

94. Id.
at 311-13.
95. Id.at 312-13.
96. Docket Entries, Farid1,6 T.C. 652 (No. 2968).
97. Id.
98. Transcript of Testimony, Appendix to Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at
29, FaridI, 160 F.2d 812 (2d. Cir. 1947) (No. 154-20400).The government's brief
to the Second Circuit reflects an expanded argument; it is unclear whether the
embellishments were argued to the Tax Court or not.
99. Brief for the Respondent at 11, FaridH, 160 F.2d 812 (No. 154-20400); see also
Id.
at 21-22.
100. "In our opinion the income tax provisions are not to be construed as
though they were in pari materia with either the estate tax law or the gift tax
statutes." Farid11, 160 F.2d at 814.
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given the Supreme Court's emphatic conclusion that the estate tax and gift
tax rules are in pari materiaand must be construed together.10 '
A single paragraph in the government's Second Circuit brief hints at
what might have been a winning argument: that the transfers of shares by
S.S. to Doris were gifts without consideration because they occurred before
the marriage, at a point when Doris had no interest in her future husband's
property or estate that she could give up in exchange. However, the
government did not pursue this argument.
B.

Why Doris Might Have Agreed to the Stipulated Facts

Doris's counsel might have stipulated to a different version of the
facts than Doris had earlier propounded because he was unfamiliar with
Doris's earlier account of the story. The attorney who wrote the Tax Court
brief and who made oral arguments entered his appearance in the litigation
more than twenty years after Doris signed the antenuptial agreement and
almost eighteen years after she was divorced from S.S. 102 (The Stipulation 0of3
Facts was filed five months after this attorney's entry of appearance).1
Before the internet age, indeed before the microfilm age, perhaps old stories
became lore, 10 4 then myth, and maybe then were forgotten. Maybe Doris
chose not to share the full story with her lawyers, merely sharing with him
her copy of the antenuptial agreement and noting that she had received only
(one block of) 2,500 shares from S.S. prior to their marriage.
Perhaps Doris's lawyer stipulated to the facts because they reflected
Doris's best chance of winning in the Tax Court. If she had both
acknowledged receiving the 2,500 shares prior to her marriage and alleged
that they belonged to her without conditions as of the date of transfer, as she
had in her prior litigation with S.S., the Tax Court might have reasonably
concluded that those shares were a gift, without consideration, on the date of
transfer, dictating a carryover basis. This point is analyzed in Part V.A. of
this Article.

101. "The guiding light is what was said in Estate of Sanford v.
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44, 60 S.Ct. 51, 56, 84 L.Ed. 20: 'The gift tax was
supplementary to the estate tax. The two are in pari materia and must be construed
together."' Merrill, 324 U.S. at 311-13.
102. Docket Entries, supra note 96, at 3 (Entry of Appearance of August
Merill, Sept. 10, 1945). Mr. Merill replaced another attorney, James Maxwell
Fassett, whom Doris had originally retained. Id at 1-2.
103. Docket Entries, supra note 96, at 3 (Stipulation of Facts filed Dec. 10,
1945).
104. One might speculate that Doris was not interested in reliving the past.
Indeed, as Part III of this Article and the Epilogue demonstrate, she lived a colorful
and somewhat embarrassing life.
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V.

DORIS'S BASIS UNDER THE REAL FACTS

If Doris's earlier version of the facts had been presented to the Tax
Court, her acquisition of shares would have been characterized as a gift, and
she would have taken a carryover basis in the shares as a result.
A.

The Transfer of Shares was a Gift Before the Marriage

When Doris sued S.S. seeking additional shares, counsel for both
parties agreed that S.S. had transferred 2,500 shares to Doris prior to their
marriage, at a time when S.S. was married to another woman.' 1 5 S.S. first
transferred 700 shares and later transferred an additional 1,800.106 The
Stipulation of Facts in Farid is consistent on this point, declaring that S.S.
transferred 700 shares to Doris in December 1923 and the remaining 1,800
on or about January 23, 1924.107 The Stipulation expressly states that all
2,500 shares were to be held by Doris "for her benefit and protection10 in
the
8
event that said Kresge should die prior to the contemplated marriage."'
When Doris received the 2,500 shares in two installments, she
became the owner of those shares as a matter of law. 0 9 Under common law
principles, ownership of property is transferred when there is a gift - "a
voluntary, immediate transfer of property without consideration from one
person (the donor) to another person (the donee)."' 10 Once an inter vivos gift
has been made, it is irrevocable."' All three requirements for a valid inter

105. Justice Paves Way for Kresge Reunion, supra note 60, at 5.

106. Id.
107. Stipulation of Facts, supra note 2,

2.

108. Id.
109. The shares were held in street name. See infra text accompanying
notes 119-124. In the absence of information on how the account was titled, this
Article assumes that Doris was the sole beneficial owner. This assumption is
consistent with both the Second Circuit opinion and the Stipulation of Facts, which
state that the shares were delivered to Doris. (They do not, for example, reflect or
imply the creation of a joint account with right of survivorship or an account in
S.S.'s name payable to Doris upon his death. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 32.4 cmts. d & e, reporter's notes 3 & 4 (1992)).
In the litigation between Doris and S.S., S.S.'s attorney asserted in his opening
statement that the parties had discussed placing the shares in trust, "but this [idea]
was abandoned." Justice Paves Way for Kresge Reunion, supra note 60, at 5.
110. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 5.02 (2d ed.

2007).
111. Id.
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vivos gift - intent, delivery, and acceptance 1 2 _ were present at the instant
11 3
the shares were transferred to Doris.
1.

Intent

Both versions of the facts support a conclusion that S.S. intended to
make an immediate gift when he transferred the shares. There is no evidence
to the contrary; there is no reason to suspect, for example, that S.S. intended
the gift to take effect only when he and Doris became husband and wife.
Indeed, the Stipulation of Facts directly contradicts such a notion in stating
14
that Doris would have kept the shares had S.S. died prior to the wedding."
Likewise, there was no mention in either litigation of conditions on the gift,
such as an obligation to return the shares if the couple did not marry. 115'
Nonetheless, without any factual basis, Doris's brief in the Second Circuit
asserted that possession of the shares had been turned1 6 over to her
conditionally prior to execution of the antenuptial agreement.
2.

Delivery

The Second Circuit opinion in Farid explicitly states that S.S.
delivered the shares to Doris.
112. Id.
§ 5.03 [A].
113. Cf Estate of Copley v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 17 (1950), affd, 194
F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1952). In Copley, a couple entered into an antenuptial agreement
and married in 1931, prior to enactment of the federal gift statute. The husband
agreed to transfer $1,000,000 to his wife immediately after their marriage but made
the actual transfers in 1936 and 1944. The court held that for gift tax purposes, the
gifts occurred when the agreement became binding in 1931. One commentator has
indicated that the principle applied in Copley does not apply to transfers that are
made prior to the marriage. LEON GABINET, TAx ASPECTS OF MARITAL
DISSOLUTION § 14.4 (2d ed. 2011). The analysis in this Article is consistent with
Gabinet's position; an antenuptial agreement is irrelevant with respect to a gift that
was completed prior to the marriage.
114. Stipulation of Facts, supranote 2, 2.
115. Conditional gift issues often arise in the context of engagement rings,
where courts are called upon to decide whether a ring must be returned when an
engagement is broken. The legal issue is whether the ring was given subject to an
implied condition subsequent (i.e., the marriage). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 6.2 cmt. m (2003);
SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW, supra note 110, § 5.03[B]. As
stated above, the Stipulation of Facts in FaridI reflects that there were no conditions
on the transfer of shares. (Doris received an engagement ring from S.S. reportedly
valued at $16,000. Justice Paves Way for Kresge Reunion, supranote 60, at 5).

116. Brief for Appellant at 14, Farid11, 160 F.2d 812 (2d. Cir. 1947) (No.
154-20400).
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In December 1923 when the petitioner, then unmarried, and
S. S. Kresge, then married, were contemplating their future
marriage, he delivered to her 700 shares of the common
stock of the S. S. Kresge Company which then had a fair
market value of $290 per share. The shares were all in street
form and were to be held by the petitioner "for her benefit
and protection in the event that the said Kresge should die
prior to the contemplated marriage between the petitioner
and said Kresge." The latter was divorced from his wife on
January 9, 1924, and on or about January 23, 1924 he
delivered to the petitioner 1800 additional common shares of
S. S. Kresge Company which were also in street form and
were to be held by the petitioner for the same purposes as
were the first 700 shares he had delivered to her."'
18

This wording is consistent with the Stipulation of Facts."
The shares were held in "street name," a practice under which shares
are recorded in corporate records as owned by a brokerage firm on behalf of
an unnamed customer. 1 9 Under this common arrangement, the brokerage,
not the beneficial owner, is the holder of record.120 The individual investor
retains all rights of ownership (e.g., how the stock is voted and whether to
sell).' 2 ' Thus, the fact that S.S. transferred Doris's stock to an account in
street name before the marriage and had the corporation register the stock in
her name after the marriage 22 has no bearing on the date of delivery or
transfer so long as the brokerage account was hers. 123 The opinion and

117. FaridIf, 160 F.2d at 813 (emphasis added). The opinion goes on to
state that Doris signed the antenuptial agreement at a time when she "still retained
the possession of the stock so delivered to her." Id.
118. Farid11, 160 F.2d at 813. Press coverage of Doris's attorney's opening
statement when she sued S.S. reflects the same language. Justice Paves Way for
Kresge Reunion, supra note 60, at 5.
119. See Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 799 (6th ed. 2011).
120. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, MONEY MANAGEMENT FOR LAWYERS AND

§ 14.6 (1999). A beneficial owner who is not a record owner is not
recognized by the corporation as a shareholder for dividend, voting or other
purposes. The beneficial owner has legally enforceable rights, however, to compel
the record owner to vote the shares as she demands and to turn over any dividends
received. Id.
121. ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS § 19.2 (5th ed. 2006).
122. Stipulation of Facts, supra note 2, 4 (S.S. caused the shares to be
transferred to Doris on the Company's books on or about May 6, 1924).
123. See Morrison v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. Memo (CCH) 251, T.C.
Memo (P-H)
87,112 (1987) (for purposes of the charitable contribution deduction,
CLIENTS
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Stipulation of Facts support a conclusion that it was. Indeed, Doris's attorney
in the prior litigation asserted that S.S. had insisted on the delay in recording
the premarital transfer on the corporate books
because "as a man with a wife
24
and five children, he wanted it kept secret."'
3.

Acceptance

There is nothing to indicate that Doris did not accept the shares.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that she did.125 In turn, if the
preceding analysis is correct, the gift was complete well before Doris signed
the antenuptial agreement, and she owned those shares at the time she signed
the agreement.126 The shares, then, could not have constituted legal
consideration for her agreement to cede her marital and property rights
because she did not actually receive anything in return for giving up those
rights; the shares were already hers. The gift was received prior to the
marriage without
condition and, therefore, Doris should have taken a
127
carryover basis.
B.

Gifts to Mistresses are Excluded from Income

Doris's lawyers could have argued that she was entitled to a cost
(market value) basis in the shares because they were received in exchange

a gift of stock held in street name is complete on the date on which the brokerage
transfers shares to the donee's account).
124. Justice Paves Way for Kresge Reunion, supra note 60, at 5.
125. See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE

TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. i (2003) (acceptance by donee is presumed, subject to donee's
right to refuse or disclaim).
126. This approach is consistent with the Tax Court's analysis of similar
facts in Marshman v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 269 (1958), rev'd on other grounds,
Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960). In Marshman, the
taxpayer had divorced in 1934. In 1937, her ex-husband asked her to remarry him,
and, as a condition to remarriage, the taxpayer asked him to provide "some financial
security." Marshman, 279 F.2d at 28. Her ex-husband then transferred shares of
publicly traded stock to the taxpayer, and the next day, the couple remarried.
However, the second marriage met the same fate as the first. The taxpayer then sold
some of her shares after the divorce, raising the question of her basis in the stock for
purposes of calculating the gain realized on the sale. The Tax Court determined that
the shares had been acquired by gift prior to the marriage, resulting in a carryover
basis.
127. The facts alleged in Doris's Tax Court petition implied that she would
argue that the shares were bargained for consideration in exchange for her interest in
the brokerage account that S.S. had previously established for her. Amended
Petition, supra note 84, 5(D). This argument, however, was not pursued.
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for services 28 Such an argument, of course, could have been embarrassing
to Doris. 129 In the absence of authority,1 30 however, Doris's attorney might
well have prevailed had he urged this line of reasoning. Subsequent
jurisprudence, nonetheless, has not been sympathetic to this argument.
Although there were no cases on point at the time Faridwas litigated, courts
that have considered the issue since then have invariably held that transfers
of cash or property from married men to their mistresses are excludable gifts
where there is no evidence that the recipient is or has been engaged in the
business of prostitution.
Basic principles for determining whether a transfer or payment is a
3
gift are set forth in Commissioner v. Duberstein.1
1 Although the Duberstein
articulation is considered the governing rule or standard,132 the Supreme
Court explicitly declined to "promulgate a new 'test' in this area to serve as a
standard to be applied by the lower courts and by the Tax Court in dealing
with the numerous cases that arise.' 33 The Court preferred instead that fact
finders apply their own "experience[s] with the mainsprings of human
conduct to the totality of the facts of each case."' 134 Nonetheless, students of
the tax law invariably define a gift by reference to Duberstein, as a transfer
128. Property that is received as compensation for services takes a basis
equal to its fair market value because that is the amount includable in the taxpayer's
income for the year of receipt. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS
41.2.5 (2d/3d ed. 1998). If a taxpayer
had received compensation in cash in an amount equal to the fair market value of the
property actually received, and had used that cash to purchase property at a fair
market value price, the cost basis in that property would be its fair market value. A
different basis cannot be justified merely because the property is acquired directly.
Id.
129. Doris did not report the receipt of shares in income when she received
them. This fact, however, is equally damning under her argument in Farid1, which
the Court of Appeals subsequently adopted. In any event, the statute of limitations
had run. See I.R.C. § 6501.
130. The first case to address the tax consequences of payments to a
mistress who was not a prostitute was decided in 1966, twenty years after the Tax
Court issued its decision in Farid I and nineteen years after the Second Circuit
rendered its decision. Starks v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. Memo (CCH) 676, T.C.
Memo (P-H) 66,134 (1966) (payments were gifts).
131. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
132. See, e.g., United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 247 (3d Cir. 2007);
Lane v. United States, 286 F.3d 723, 728-29 (4th Cir. 2002); Peracchi v.
Commissioner, 143 F.3d 487, 496 (9th Cir. 1998); Goodwin v. United States, 67
F.3d 149, 151-52 (8th Cir. 1995) ("applying Duberstein's objective, no-talisman
approach to evaluating transferor intent"); United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125,
128-29, 1131 (7th Cir 1991).
133. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 284-85.
134. Id.at 289.
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motivated by "'a detached and disinterested generosity.""51 35 The "most
critical consideration"' 36 is the transferor's intention; "'[w]hat controls is the
intention with which payment, however voluntary, has been made."", 137 Thus,
a transfer that is made "'out of affection, respect, admiration, charity, or like
impulses"1 38 is a gift, while a transfer that proceeds "from 'the constraining
force of any moral or legal duty, ' 139 or from 'the incentive of anticipated
benefit' of an economic nature, ' " 140 or is made "'in return for services
rendered,",,14 1 is not. Applying this test to determine whether Doris's receipt
of the shares, at a time when she was S.S.'s paramour, was an excludable gift
or taxable income would necessitate determining whether S.S. was motivated
by altruism or by an expectation of reciprocity.
Parsing a man's emotions is not easy and so, not surprisingly, courts
have had difficulty characterizing transfers of money to mistresses in the
context of long-term relationships. As one judge stated, "The motivations of
the parties in such cases will always be mixed. The relationship would not be
long term were it not for some respect or affection. Yet, it may be equally
clear that the relationship would not continue were it not for financial
support or payments.' 43 Deciding whether a transfer is purely out of
affection or, alternatively, is motivated by hopes of continuing in an
adulterous relationship, presents a thorny challenge of divining complex
motivations. 144
In a series of cases (the "mistress cases"), the Tax Court has been
called upon to decide whether funds paid or property transferred by men to
women in the context of nonmarital relationships were excludable gifts or
135. Id.at 285. (quoting Commisioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246
(1956)).
136. Id.
137. Id.(quoting Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 45 (1937)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
138. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 285 (quoting Robertson v. United States, 343
U.S. 711,715 (1952)).
139. Id
140. Id.
(quoting Bogardus, 302 U.S. at 41).
141. Id.
(quoting Robertson, 343 U.S. at 714).
142. See United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1991) (reversing

criminal convictions of two women who received money from a wealthy widower
because the government failed to present sufficient evidence of his intent regarding

the money he gave them).
143. Id.
at 1132.
144. Invariably, "efforts to determine a single dominant intent underlying
long-term, informal relationships contain problems of information, valuation, and
consistency that expose courts' inability to grapple with the intimate details of
relationships undefined by law." Debra Lefler, "Keeping Books on Romance:" The
Gift Exclusion in NonmaritalRelationships, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1739, 1742 (2011).
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includable in the recipient's gross income. 145 In each opinion, the court
examined the facts presented in light of Duberstein in an effort to discern the
swain's intent. Although each decision was based on its own particular facts,
as envisioned in Duberstein, the breakdown appears to be that men who

made "gifts" to women in the business (or even previously in the business) of
selling companionship were held not to have intended gifts 146 while men who
made gifts to women who were not in business were held to have made
nontaxable gifts. 147 Thus, because there is no evidence that Doris ever placed
her sexual services on the market, it is likely that the shares given by S.S. to
Doris prior to their marriage would have been treated as excludable gifts,
conferring upon Doris a carryover basis.
Vt.
A.

LESSONS LEARNED

Tax Considerations

The black letter law emerging from Farid may be unassailable where property is acquired in exchange for other property, the basis in the
newly acquired property is its fair market value on the date received. Indeed,
this is the holding in the seminal case of PhiladelphiaPark Amusement Co.

145. Toms v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. Memo (CCH) 2234, T.C. Memo
(RIA) 1992-125 (1992); Austin v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. Memo (CCH) 520, T.C.
Memo (P-H) 85,022 (1985); Reis v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1333,
T.C. Memo (P-H) 74,287 (1974); Libby v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. Memo (CCH)

915, T.C. Memo (P-H)

69,184 (1969); Starks v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. Memo

(CCH) 676, T.C. Memo (P-H) 66,134 (1966); Brizendine v. Commissioner, 16
T.C. Memo (CCH) 149, T.C. Memo (P-H)
57,032 (1957); Blevins v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. Memo (CCH) 840, T.C. Memo (P-H) 55,211 (1955). See

Lefler, supra note 144, at 1741 (discussing the "mistress cases").
146. Toms, 63 T.C. Memo (CCH) 2234, T.C. Memo (RIA)
1992-125;
Brizendine, 16 T.C. Memo (CCH) 149, T.C. Memo (P-H) 57,032; Blevins, 14 T.C.
Memo (CCH) 840, T.C. Memo (P-H) 55,211; see also Lefler, supra note 144 at

1754-57 (courts have "used prostitution as a proxy for intent").
147. Austin, 49 T.C. Memo (CCH) 520, T.C. Memo (P-H)

85,022; Reis,

33 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1333, T.C. Memo (P-H)
74,287; Libby, 28 T.C. Memo
(CCH) 915, T.C. Memo (P-H) 69,184; Starks, 25 T.C. Memo (CCH) 676, T.C.
Memo (P-H)
66,134. Similarly, the Tax Court has held that payments or gifts
between unmarried cohabitating couples are gifts. Estate of Cavett v. Commissioner,
79 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1662, T.C. Memo (RIA) 2000-091 (2000); Pascarelli v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1082 (1971), affd, 485 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1973). "If these
cases make a rule of law, it is that a person is entitled to treat cash and property
received from a lover as gifts, as long as the relationship consists of something more
than specific payments for specific sessions of sex." United States v. Harris, 942
F.2d 1125, 1133-34 (7th Cir. 1991).
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v. United States. 48 The difference between the courts' analyses in the two
cases, however, is that the decision in PhiladelphiaPark is premised on the
property exchange having been taxable. The basis in the newly acquired
property must be its fair market value in order to ensure that recognized gain
is not recognized again or that recognized loss is not taken into account
twice 4 9 The Second Circuit opinion in Farid,however, nowhere recognizes
the relationship between taxability on the initial exchange and basis in the
acquired property. Thus, Doris achieved the best of all proverbial worlds no taxable
gain on the exchange in which she acquired the shares, and a basis
50
step-up.

Surprisingly, there appear to be no cases in which the government
has argued that a person in Doris's position realizes gain on the release of
marital rights in exchange for property, prior to marriage. The issue has
come up, however, in the analogous context of marital breakups, where a
divorcing spouse cedes her marital rights in a bargained for exchange for
property. In the divorce context, the IRS's administrative position for many
years was that (1) there was no gain or loss to a spouse who released marital
rights in exchange for property and (2) her basis nonetheless was the fair
market value of the property on the date of it was received.151 One would

148. 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
149. Id. at 188-89 ("To maintain harmony with the fundamental purpose of
these sections, it is necessary to consider the fair market value of the property
received as the cost basis to the taxpayer. The failure to do so would result in
allowing the taxpayer a stepped-up basis, without paying a tax therefor, if the fair
market value of the property received is less than the fair market value of the
property given, and the taxpayer would be subjected to a double tax if the fair market
value of the property received is more than the fair market value of the property
given. By holding that the fair market value of the property received in a taxable
exchange is the cost basis, the above discrepancy is avoided and the basis of the
property received will equal the adjusted basis of the property given plus any gain
recognized, or that should have been recognized, or minus any loss recognized, or
that should have been recognized.")
150. Following the logic in UnitedStates v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), S.S.
should have been taxed on the transfer of shares to Doris. BORIS 1.BITTKER, MARTIN
J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 30.04[4] (3d ed. 2002); DAVID WESTFALL ET AL., ESTATE PLANNING
LAW AND TAXATION
11.07[l] (2003). Since 1984, prudent planning would be to

transfer shares after the couple is married in order to take advantage of I.R.C. §
1041.
151. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63; Davis, 370 U.S. at 73 n.7 ("Under
the present administrative practice, the release of marital rights in exchange for
property or other consideration is not considered a taxable event as to the wife.").
Revenue Ruling 67-221, which essentially confirms the statement in Davis, does not

indicate whether there is no gain or loss realized, or recognized.
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hope that the IRS would have taken the same position with respect to
premarital transfers but there is no authority.' 5 2
Since 1984, attorneys advising clients in Doris's position can rely on
section 1041, which provides that gain or loss is not recognized on property
transfers between spouses and that property received from a spouse is treated
as a gift, even if there is consideration, with the result that the transferee
takes a carryover basis. 153 Although a fair market value basis usually is
preferable to a carryover, the certainty of clear statutory authority is
comforting nonetheless. Because section 1041 applies only to transfers
between spouses, however, modem antenuptial agreements typically delay
54
property transfers until after a couple is married.1
B.

Litigation Considerations

Outside the context of Section 1041 and without the certainty of
precedential principles, Doris achieved a stunning result only because her
attorneys framed her story as an exchange of valuable property rights for
shares. Had the tale been cast instead as perhaps it should have been, with
Doris receiving gifts of shares from a paramour at a time he was legally
estopped from marrying her on account of a prior matrimonial entanglement,
both courts likely would have regarded the transfer of shares as a gift
notwithstanding the couple's subsequent marriage.
Doris's counsel's
strategy was a long shot, in light of Wemyss 5 5 and Merill,156 but brilliant in
the end. Students of Farid will never know, however, whether counsel's
actions were intentional or inadvertent.
The importance of the Stipulation of Facts in Farid cannot be
overstated, certainly from a procedural standpoint (as the Tax Court did not
participate in the fact "finding" process) but, perhaps more importantly, from
the perspective of influencing the outcome of the case. Doris could have
been portrayed in a less sympathetic manner, as an aspiring actress who
seduced an older, married gentleman of prominence, and who was able to
induce her lover to transfer substantial sums of money and stock to her. Such
a depiction would have been entirely consistent with the actual facts as they
were reported in the newspapers of the day, and would probably have
resulted in a less favorable judicial outcome. The Stipulation of Facts,
however, downplays the tawdriness of the couple's relationship while, at the
same time, emphasizes the magnitude of the inheritance rights Doris

152. Accord BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 150 at 5.02[6].
153. I.R.C. § 1041(a), (b).
154. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 150 at 5.02[6].
155. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
156. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945).

Florida Tax Review

[Vol 13:9

relinquished in exchange for a mere 2500 shares. Portrayed in this light, the
story portends a sympathetic ending.
Trial lawyers know the importance of facts in winning a case. To
succeed with a jury, a trial lawyer must weave a story from the evidence in a
manner that evokes empathy for her client's position. 57 Similarly, the way
that facts are presented in an appellate brief s statement of facts can persuade
indirectly, through an organization that emphasizes favorable facts and
through choices of wording that affect the reader without stating anything
that opposing counsel could reasonably claim is inaccurate. 158 Whether the
facts as stipulated in Farid resulted from a strategic decision by Doris's
lawyer, or not, they portrayed Doris in the most favorable light possible
given that (1) she agreed in writing to relinquish her marital property rights
in exchange for 2500 shares and (2) she received 2500 shares.
Viewed in this light, Farid provides a perfect example for the legal
storytelling movement, which emphasizes the use of story and narrative
techniques in law practice and teaching. 159 Legal storytelling scholarship
teaches that "[t]he heart of persuasive legal advocacy is the facts of the
client's story.' 160 As described by one commentator:
The basic concept of storytelling in legal writing is
to turn the client/plaintiff/defendant into the main character
of a story with a compelling plotline ....The fundamental
principle espoused by most of these [legal storytelling]
scholars is that there is a power in stories that lawyers should
harness in their advocacy. Those promoting storytelling in
the law contend that well-constructed stories have as much
power to persuade as well-developed and well-reasoned
61
legal arguments that rely on logic and precedent.'
While it is impossible to know how the appellate judges who decided for the
taxpayer in Farid regarded Doris, it is likely that their opinion of her was
157. Kenneth D. Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story,
14 LEGAL WRITING 127, 131 (2008).

158. RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING
§ 29.1 (6th ed. 2009).
159. Jeanne M. Kaiser, When the Truth and the Story Collide: What Legal
Writers Can Learn from the Experience of Non-Fiction Writers About the Limits of
Legal Storytelling, 16 LEGAL WRITING 163, 163-64 (2010).

160. Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion:An Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. Ass'N
75, 77 (2009); cf Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the
Supreme Court: Suggestionsfor Effective Case Presentations,37 A.B.A. J. 801, 803
(1951) ("It may sound paradoxical, but most contentions of law are won or lost on
the facts.").
161. Kaiser, supra note 159 at 165-66.
LEGAL WRITING DIRS.
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more favorable than it would have been had they been presented with the real
facts. At best, the Stipulation of Facts might have aroused their sympathy
and, at worst, it might have left them agnostic; nothing in the opinion implies
a negative impression.
C.

EthicalConsiderations

The importance of facts and how they are presented in litigation
might tempt attorneys to ignore facts that are unhelpful or to shade the truth
in making their clients' cases. The ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct
3.3 addresses such enticements by mandating candor in all aspects ofjudicial
proceedings. 62 The Model Rules, of course, were adopted many years after
Faridwas litigated, but modern lawyers engaged in the process of stipulating
facts must be mindful of them.
Model Rule 3.3 provides in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement
of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement
of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the
lawyer;... or (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by
the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the
tribunal.

(c) The duties stated in paragraph[]
(a) ...
163

continue to the

conclusion of the proceeding.

This rule applies only to conduct in proceedings before a "tribunal," defined
to include, inter alia, "a court,"' 16 4 and envisioning, generally, a "body
actfing] in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the
presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a
binding legal judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular
162.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2012). ABA

3.3 (2012). See also MODEL

Model Rule 4.1 prohibits
untruthfulness to others, generally. The major differences between Model Rule 3.3
and Model Rule 4.1 are that Model Rule 3.3 (1) applies to all statements regardless
of materiality and (2) can require a lawyer to disclose information otherwise
protected by Model Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information).
163. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3.
164. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. I(m).
RULES OF
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166
matter."' 165 Certainly the Tax Court is a tribunal for purposes of this rule.
The Internal Revenue Service, however, is not. 67 Thus, while other
principles of ethics require honesty in dealings with the IRS," 68 Model Rule
3.3 does not. The distinction is meaningless in the context of Tax Court
litigation, however, because a stipulation of facts agreed to by taxpayer's
counsel and the IRS will be submitted to the court, thereby implicating
Model Rule 3.3.169
The proscriptions against making false statements and offering false
evidence apply only to statements and evidence that a lawyer knows are
false. Therefore, if a lawyer reasonably believes that a client's story is
truthful, she does not violate Model Rule 3.3 in recounting that story to the

court.170 (This, of course, raises questions regarding a lawyer's duty to

inquire and, perhaps, conscious ignorance. 71) It follows that Model Rule 3.3
precludes counsel from agreeing to stipulate to facts, which they know are
untrue.
In hindsight, it is obvious that Doris's counsel gained a great
advantage from the manner in which the Stipulation of Facts was drafted,
165. Id.

166. Indeed, practitioners appearing before the Tax Court are required to
comply with the ABA Model Rules. TAX CT. R. 201(a) (2010).
167. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 314
(1965). The Opinion reasons as follows:
[The IRS] has no machinery or procedure for adversary
proceedings before impartial judges or arbiters, involving the
weighing of conflicting testimony of witnesses examined and
cross-examined by opposing counsel and the consideration of
arguments of counsel for both sides of a dispute. While its
procedures provide for 'fresh looks' through departmental reviews
and informal and formal conferences procedures, few will contend
that the service provides any truly dispassionate and unbiased
consideration to the taxpayer. Although willing to listen to
taxpayers and their representatives and obviously intending to be
fair, the service is not designed and does not purport to be
unprejudiced and unbiased in the judicial sense.
168. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1.
169. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 1 (rule applies
when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted
pursuant to the tribunal's adjudicative authority, for example a deposition).
170. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 ("An advocate is
responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually
not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein, for litigation
documents ordinarily present assertions by the client, or by someone on the client's
behalf, and not assertions by the lawyer.").
171. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120
cmt. c (2000).
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both because the story it told did not reflect the true facts in material respects
and because it painted a picture of Doris that was most sympathetic. This
Article has suggested that Doris's counsel might have been unaware of the
factual discrepancies but also proposed that he might have agreed to the
stipulation purely for strategic reasons. Counsel for the government might
have agreed to the stipulations for the same reasons. Indeed, the very nature
of the Tax Court's stipulation procedure, mandatory as it is and without
scrupulous involvement or oversight by the court, invites strategic but
dishonest participation. It is clear, however, that even if both sides are happy
with the wording in any or all respects, counsel violate their duty of candor
under Model Rule 3.3 by submitting a stipulation of facts, which they know
is false. Thus, strategic stipulations must be avoided. Perhaps this is why the
Internal Revenue Manual prohibits IRS attorneys from agreeing to
stipulations of fact that are not
known to be true, even if they believe that the
12
irrelevant.
are
facts
particular
VlI.

CONCLUSION

At the outset, the purpose of the research project culminating in this
Article was merely to uncover the secrets of Princess Doris Farid-esSultaneh. In the process, however, it became apparent that something was
amiss. The story of Doris's courtship and marriage, in particular how she
came to acquire shares that she later sold, was inaccurately reflected in the
evidence on which her tax case was litigated and decided and, therefore, also
in the appellate court opinion that has been parsed and memorized by
generations of tax students. Whether the differences between the story told
here and that recounted in the Stipulation of Facts in the case were
intentionally devised, or not, probably will never be known. These
differences significantly affected the outcome of the case, and raise thoughtprovoking and important questions about the role of fact development and
fact finding in the judicial process. Lawyers and students alike should be
schooled in the role and art of storytelling, but also cautioned against lying in
the process. Doris's tale provides a rich illustration of the power of a story
well told. 173 Had the courts known the facts as they really happened, a
victory for the government would have been the likely result.

172. I.R.M. 35.4.7.4.
173. "The mastery of effective story telling is not what you say but how you
say it. How you tell a story effects [sic] how the universe preserves it." KERRY
PARKER

FILMS, http://kerryparkerfilms.com/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
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EPILOGUE: WHAT HAPPENED TO DORIS AND S.S.?

For those of us who have studied Farid, the desire to know what
happened to Doris, and perhaps to S.S., is palpable.174 Here follows a brief
chronicle of the remaining years of the couple's brief marriage and their
divorce, and selected stories from their fascinating lives.
A.

The Remainder of the Marriage

Despite reports that the couple had reconciled after settling Doris's
suit seeking an additional 2,500 shares, the marriage remained tumultuous.
Less than three months after the legal proceedings had ended, Doris sailed to
Europe alone. 175 Six weeks later, with Doris abroad, S.S. sued for divorce,
claiming that the couple had separated and never reconciled.17776 Doris
returned from Europe, vowing to fight S.S.'s "unwarranted action."'
S.S. initiated the divorce action in Detroit. 178 The likely explanation
for his decision to file in Michigan rather than in New York, where the
couple lived and had married, is that grounds for divorce in Michigan were
broader than in New York, which permitted divorce solely on the ground of
adultery. 179 The suit charged Doris with abandonment. 180 It is also possible
that S.S. believed that a court in Detroit would be more sympathetic to him
than a court in New York. The Company was headquartered in Detroit and

174. E.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Stories and Tax Histories: Is There a
Role for History in Shaping Tax Law?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2227, 2230 (2003)

(asserting that "the story of Walter [sic] Kresge's prenuptial agreement with Farides-Sultaneh would make for more interesting reading than the humdrum divorce in
[United States v.] Davis, [370 U.S. 65 (1962)]," which was discussed in a book
reviewed in the cited article; Davis is discussed supra at notes 150-151 and
accompanying text). Betraying a lack of information on "the real story," Prof. AviYonah describes Doris as Persian belly dancer. Id.at 2230 n. 22. Doris, of course,
was born and raised in Pittsburgh. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
175. Kresge's Wife Sails; Divorce Talk Denied,N.Y.

TIMES,

June 1, 1926,

at 17.
176. Kresge Asks Divorcefrom Second Wife, CHI.TRIB., July 16, 1926, at 1.
177. Mrs. Kresge Returns to Fight Divorce Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,

1926, at 5 (quoting Doris).
178. Id.
179. J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce
Reform Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 559 (2007). New York
became the last state to adopt no fault divorce in 2010. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
170(7) (McKinney 2010); TIMOTHY

TIPPINS, NEW YORK MATRIMONIAL LAW AND

PRACTICE § 14:1.10 (2011).

180. Can'tHalt Kresge Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1926, at 46.
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S.S. presumably had professional and personal relationships there. New
York, on the other hand, was home only to his extramarital dalliances.
Rather than responding in Detroit, Doris persuaded a New York
court to enjoin S.S. from prosecuting the Michigan action because he was a
resident of New York. In the New York court's view, the court in Detroit
lacked jurisdiction over the matter.18s The judge presiding in Michigan,
however, did not consider himself bound by the New York injunction and
permitted the action to continue, but noted that S.S. himself was subject to
the injunction and, therefore, could be held in contempt by the New York
court should he proceed." 2 S.S. withdrew his action and Doris withdrew

hers. 183
Six months later, in May 1927, S.S. tried again. This time, he
specifically claimed to have established residence in Michigan.' 84 Doris did
not respond initially, 8 5 choosing instead to commence divorce proceedings
in New York. 86 Although Doris did not seek alimony, she asked the court to
compel S.S. to pay her attorneys' fees, arguing that her assets and income
8 7
should not be impaired by the proceeding, in light of S.S.'s philandering.1
Evidence was introduced concerning a "raid," in April 1927, of a Manhattan
apartment maintained by S.S. under the name Mr. Jones.188 Doris had
retained the services of a detective agency, 89 which had followed S.S. and a

181. Kresge Enjoined in Divorce Action, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1926, at 18.
182. Can't Halt Kresge Suit, supra note 180, at 46.
183. Kresge Drops Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1926, at 3; Kresges Drop
Legal Battles; No Explanation, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1926, at 14. The attorney who
represented Doris in defending against the Michigan divorce, as well as in the earlier
litigation over the entitlement to shares, ultimately sued her to collect his fees. Asks
$51,000 as Feefrom Mrs. Kresge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1927, at 33.
184. Kresge Sues Wife Againfor Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1927, at 27.
185. Kresge's Wife Failsto Reply to Divorce Suit, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 1927,
at 20.
186. Mrs. Kresge Asks Divorce,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1927, at 27.
187. Wife's Attorney Charges Kresge is Philanderer,CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17,
1927, at 3.
188. Asserts S.S. Kresge was Caught in a Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1927,
at 10.
189. Doris apparently neglected to pay her private detective's bill. Valerian
O'Farrell, head of the detective agency, travelled to France, where Doris sought
refuge after the divorce, to collect the $32,066 balance due on his $46,016 fee; he
was unsuccessful. Kresge's Ex-Wife Sued by Detective, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1929, at
3; Ex-Mrs. Kresge Divorce Snooper Asks $32,000 Fee, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 23, 1929, at
4. He then filed suit against Doris in New York. Kresge's Ex-Wife Suedby Detective,
supra, at 3.
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young woman, Gladys Ardelle Fish, to the apartment, 90 where Ms. Fish was
found under the bed,' 91 "scantily clad."' 92 S.S.'s attorney argued that "he
couldn't see how the state of dress or undress of a co-respondent in a divorce
action can influence the granting of counsel fees."' 9 3 A housekeeper testified
that Ms. Fish "was a frequent visitor, came at all hours and had her own key.
• .. The housekeeper said she must have remained all night occasionally
because she saw the young woman there in the morning. She said that a
much younger woman than Miss Fish was also a visitor.' 94 The divorce
complaint alleged misconduct with various women, including a sixteen-year19 6
old girl.' 95 The court declined to order S.S. to pay Doris's counsel fees.
197
S.S. did not contest the divorce or personally appear in court.
Nonetheless, a jury trial lasting one hour was held. After fifteen minutes of
190. Wife's Attorney Charges Kresge isPhilanderer, supra note 187, at 3.
Ms. Fish was reported to be twenty-five years of age. (S.S. was sixty-one.) Mrs.
Kresge is Denied Counsel Fees in Divorce, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23, 1927, at 13.
191. Wife's Attorney Charges Kresge is Philanderer,supra note 187, at 3.
The detectives also testified that liquor was found in the apartment, "only a few feet
from where the woman's legs were sticking out from under the bed." Swear Kresge
Had Liquor in His Love Nest, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 18, 1927, at 1. S.S. was known as a
supporter and benefactor of the Anti-Saloon League, an organization that advocated
prohibition. Id.After the trial, leaders of the Anti-Saloon League debated whether to
return a $500,000 gift ithad received from S.S. but decided to keep it.
Will Keep
Kresge's Gift, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1928, at 12; Refuse Kresge's $500,000 Gift,
Appeal to Drys, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1928, at 16; Bishop Declares S.S. Kresge Gift
"Pure Business," CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 1928, at 3. Rev. James Thomas, an Episcopal
minister, defended the decision on religious grounds: "In this case I should say, the
thought to be applied is, that the Lord gave it, though the devil brought it, so the
league should keep it." Kresge's Gifts, TIME, Feb. 20, 1928, at 37.
192. Swear Kresge Had Liquor in His Love Nest, supra note 191, at 1.
193. Wife's Attorney Charges Kresge is Philanderer,supra note 187, at 3.
194. Asserts S.S. Kresge was Caught in a Raid, supra note 188, at 10. The
housekeeper also testified that she had seen Ms. Fish in bed one Sunday morning,
with S.S. being present in the room. Ms. Fish was introduced as S.S.'s secretary.
Kresge Held Guilty by Divorce Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1928, at 23.
195. Wife's Attorney Charges Kresge is Philanderer,supra note 187, at 3;
Kresge Held Guilty by Divorce Jury, supra note 194, at 23; Bishop Declares S.S.
Kresge Gift "Pure Business," supra note 191, at 3 (seventeen-year-old girl). Ms.
Fish's parents asserted that their daughter and S.S. were "mere friends," having met
at church in New York. Their pastor described her as "one of the finest girls and best
workers in the church - a sweet, innocent girl." N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1927, at 30.
The Chicago Daily Tribune described Ms. Fish as "the merchant millionaire's light
o' love." Mrs. Kresge is Denied Counsel Fees in Divorce, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 23,
1927, at 13.
196. Mrs. Kresge is DeniedCounsel Fees in Divorce, supra note 195, at 13.
197. Jury Trial Granted to Mrs. Kresge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1928, at 55;
Kresge Held Guilty by Divorce Jury, supra note 194, at 23.
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deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of misconduct (with Ms. Fish) 98 and
the court signed an interlocutory divorce decree, effective in 90 days.'9 9 No
alimony was sought because there was an antenuptial agreement, and none
was granted.200 Doris issued the following statement:
The limitless power of money buys the means to
influence public opinion. Therefore, it is best to bear
injustice in silence until one can present truth proved by hard
facts. Two people could separate with dignity and not desire
to harm each other, so I was content to keep my status and to
lead a quiet life without interfering with my husband's
affairs or asking any favors whatsoever.
My present action was forced upon me in selfdefense. For two years I have been persecuted and tortured
by two unprincipled litigations brought in the State of
Michigan by my husband in his endeavor to gain his
freedom by most unscrupulous means. In order to protect my
good name I had to spend all my income fighting these
groundless litigations, but although I won in both instances it
was certain that this persecution would continue, consuming
my means and breaking my health.
The only salvation for me was to obtain my freedom
by proving the faithlessness and hypocrisy of Mr. Kresge.
This was a painful ordeal, but truth was on my side and that
is why I won. I can no longer now be prey to double-dealing
and treachery.
I always had a firm belief in the justice and
protection of a higher power. In my case these have
prevailed.2 °1

198. Kresge Held Guilty by Divorce Jury, supra note 194, at 23. The
Chicago Tribune reported that the jury "convicted Kresge of seven charges of
infidelity." Refuse Kresge's $500,000 Gift, Appeal to Drys, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1928,
at 16; see also Interlocutory Decree is Asked by Mrs. Kresge, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16,
1928, at 4 ("guilty of infidelity on seven separate occasions").
199. Divorce Granted Mrs. Kresge on Infidelity Plea, CHI. TRI3., Feb. 19,

1928, at 7.
200. Kresge Held Guilty by DivorceJury, supra note 194, at 23. Later press
reports referred to a divorce settlement of $10,000,000, S.S. Kresge Marriesfor the
Third Time, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1928, at 16; $2,000,000, $100,000 Jewel Loss on
Plane; Princess Victim, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1943, at 15; and $3,000,000, Princess
Charges $99,500 Swindle, N.Y TIMES, May I, 1947, at 26.
201. Kresge Held Guilty By Divorce Jury,supra note 194, at 23.
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Even though Doris got a divorce order in New York, the Michigan
divorce action filed by S.S. continued. Doris moved to examine her husband
before the Michigan trial about her allegations that his legal residence was in
New York.2 °2 The judge "refused to order the testimony taken, on the ground
that the decree in the New York divorce case" made the Michigan action
unnecessary.23 Nonetheless, the papers filed by the parties in connection
with Doris's motion, which included S.S.'s initial pleadings, became
available to curious reporters, who reported on the tawdry allegations. 0 4
S.S. alleged acts of cruelty, primarily that Doris had attempted to
extort $10,000,000 from him in exchange for bearing his child.20 5 If he
refused, S.S. claimed, Doris had threatened "one of the biggest scandals you
ever heard of." ' 2 06 Doris reportedly responded to S.S.'s refusal to accept her
offer by having "an operation" at a cost of $1,000.207 A statement later
released by S.S. clarified that Doris was pregnant when she made the
demand and that she terminated the pregnancy when S.S. refused to pay the
demanded sum. 20 8 "This was against my wishes," he said, "as it was my
desire that there should be children born as a result of the marriage., 20 9 The
complaint also alleged that Doris had an "intimate and close relationship"
S.S. and several friends
with two men, both referred to as "Mr. W.,,, 210 whom
21
found inside Doris's locked New York apartment. '
Doris denied all of the allegations in a statement that she distributed
212
to reporters. 2 2 First, Doris "emphatically" denied that S.S. had accused her
of infidelity; his charges, she said, were limited to "conduct unbecoming a
wife, whatever he meant by that., 2 13 As to her supposed demand for
$10,000,000 to bear his child, Doris stated, "Mr. Kresge never wanted any
more children, as he already has five by his former wife, and the disgrace he

202. Mrs. Kresge Fights Husband'sSuit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1928, at 27.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.; Wife Wanted $10,000,000 to Bear Him Child, Says Kresge, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 18, 1928, at 3.
206. Wife Wanted $10,000,000 to Bear Him Child, Says Kresge, supra note
205, at 3; Mrs. Kresge Fights Husband's Suit, supra note 202, at 27.
207. Wife Wanted $10, 000,000 to Bear Him Child,supra note 205, at 3.
208. Gladto Be Rid of Wife, Kresge Says, CHI.TRIB., May 22, 1928, at 1.
209. Wife Wanted $10,000,000 to Bear Him Child, Says Kresge, supra note
205, at 3.
210. Id.; Mrs. Kresge Fights Husband's Suit, supra note 202, at 27.
211. Wife Wanted $10,000,000 to Bear Him Child, supranote 205, at 3.
212. Wife of Kresge Denies She Was Untrue to Him, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19,
1928, at 10; Mrs. Kresge Denies Husband's Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1928, at
27.
213. Wife of Kresge Denies She Was Untrue to Him, supra note 212, at 10;
Mrs. Kresge Denies Husband's Charges, supra note 212, at 27.
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has covered himself with proves that he shows no love, consideration or
regard for them., 21 4 Regarding the allegations concerning the other
gentlemen, she explained that they were father and son. The older "Mr. W."
was a mutual friend of the couple's, who had endeavored to effect a
reconciliation between them.2 15 At the time the older Mr. W. was discovered
in Doris's apartment, he was there upon S.S.'s request that he speak to Doris
alone to try to convince her to change her mind about the divorce. 21 6 The
friends referred to in S.S.'s pleadings were actually private detectives hired
by S.S. to follow Doris and Mr. W. 21 7 Doris claimed one of them had
provided her with a sworn statement that Mr. W. was seated in a single chair,
smoking when they entered the apartment. 21 The statement went on to say
that "[tihere was no sign of anything irregular in the behavior, dress or
condition of either 'Mr. W.' or Mrs. Kresge" and that "[w]e found nothing
wrong there.",219 According to Doris, the younger Mr. W. had merely

escorted Doris home from time to time after visits with the older Mr. W. and
his wife and children at their residence.22 °
On May 18, 1928, the statutory period for the New York court's
interlocutory decree expired without objection, and the Kresges' divorce
became final. 221 S.S. withdrew the Michigan action.222 He issued a statement

declaring that he was "glad to be rid of' Doris and denied all of the charges
223
she had made during the divorce proceedings concerning other women.
Doris sailed to Europe on May 30.224
214. Wife of Kresge Denies She Was Untrue to Him, supra note 212, at 10;
Mrs. Kresge Denies Husband's Charges, supra note 212, at 27.
215. Wife of Kresge Denies She Was Untrue to Him, supra note 212, at 10;
Mrs. Kresge Denies Husband's Charges, supra note 212, at 27.
216. Wife of Kresge Denies She Was Untrue to Him, supra note 212, at 10;
Mrs. Kresge Denies Husband's Charges, supra note 212, at 27.
217. Wife of Kresge Denies She Was Untrue to Him,supra note 212, at 10;
Mrs. Kresge Denies Husband's Charges, supra note 212, at 27.
218. Wife ofKresge Denies She Was Untrue to Him, supra note 212, at 10;
Mrs. Kresge Denies Husband's Charges, supra note 212, at 27.
219. Wife ofKresge Denies She Was Untrue to Him, supra note 212, at 10;
Mrs. Kresge Denies Husband's Charges, supra note 212, at 27.
220. Wife ofKresge Denies She Was Untrue to Him, supra note 212, at 10;
Mrs. Kresge Denies Husband's Charges, supra note 212, at 27.
221. Kresge Divorce Now Final, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1928, at 30.
222. Kresge Hails Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1928, at 7.
223. Glad to Be Rid of Wife, Kresge Says, supra note 208, at 3.
224. Thaw Sails for a Rest, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1928, at 19. Among the
passengers travelling on the same voyage was Harry K. Thaw. Id.Years earlier,

Thaw had murdered architect Stanford White in Madison Square Garden. See
Douglas 0. Linder, Harry Thaw Trials (Stanford White Murder), FAMOUS TRIALS
(2009),

http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/thaw/Thawaccount.html

(last

visited Oct. 21, 2012). The story of that jealous rivalry is the basis of the novel,
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Doris
1.

Doris Becomes a Princess

In 1933, Doris married a Persian prince whom she had met in
Paris.
Press reports refer to the groom as Farid Khan Sadri 226 and as Prince
Farid of Sadri-Azam. 227 His cousin was the deposed former Shah of Persia
(now Iran).228 During his cousin's reign, the prince held the title "Farid-EsSultaneh.,, 229 The couple divorced in 1936.230 By paid advertisement
following the divorce, the prince asserted that Doris had no legal right to use
his name.23 1 Nevertheless, Doris referred to herself as Princess Doris Farides-Sultaneh for the rest of her life232 (which explains the title of her tax case).
2.

Doris Loses Her Wealth

Doris's fortunes turned. In 1947, needing money to pay taxes on her
New Jersey estate, 233 Doris consigned the 28-karat engagement ring that she
Ragtime, by E. L. Doctorow. Thomas L. Chadbourne, an attorney who founded the
law firm now known as Chadbourne & Parke, was a fellow passenger, as well. Thaw
Sails for a Rest, supra, at 19. See generally THOMAS L. CHADBOURNE, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS L. CHADBOURNE

(Charles C. Goetsch & Margaret L

Shivers, eds. 1985).
225. Report Mrs. Kresge Wed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1933, at 10. Time
Magazine described the prince as the "onetime chamberlain to Persia's late Ahmed
Shah Kadjar," Milestones, TIME, Feb. 13, 1933. Ahmed Shah Kadjar was the Shah of
Persia from 1909 until 1925. Michael P. Zirinsky, Imperial Power and Dictatorship:
Britain and the Rise of Reza Shah, 1921-1926, 24 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUDIES 639
(1992). Ahmed was the last Shah of the Qajar dynasty; he was exiled to Europe in
1923 and deposed in 1925. Mansoureh Ettehadieh, Qajar, Ahmad, Shah of Iran,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST

(2004).

226. Report Mrs. Kresge Wed, supra note 225, at 10.
227. Divorce Parts Prince and Ex-Mrs. Kresge, N.Y.

TIMES,

July 1, 1936,

at 8.
228. The Princess, THE GLEN ALPIN CONSERVANCY, http://glenalpin.org/
the-princess-period.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
229. Divorce PartsPrince and Ex-Mrs. Kresge, supra note 227 at 8.
230. Id.; Milestones, supra note 225.
231. Divorce PartsPrince and Ex-Mrs. Kresge, supra note 227 at 8; Prince
to Write Book on His Divorcefrom Mrs. S.S. Kresge, CHI. TRIB., July 1, 1936, at 3.
232. See, e.g., The Princess, supra note 228 ("the telephone company listed
her as the Princess, so that was how everyone in Harding knew her); PrincessFarides-Sultaneh, 74, Ex-Wife of S.S. Kresge, Dead,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1963, at 31.
233. Doris purchased the sixteen-room, 18-acre Morristown estate in 1940.
The Princess, supra note 228; Princess to Auction $75, 000 Furnishings,N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 1949, at 36. Known as Glen Alpin, the estate was sold at a sheriffs sale in
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received from S.S. to a Fifth Avenue (New York City) jeweler.234
Constantino Vincent Riccardi, who turned out to be a convicted stock
swindler (among other things),235 convinced Doris that he could get a higher
price for the ring. He also persuaded her to add six other jewelry pieces and
proposed marriage, inducing her to ship furnishings from her New Jersey
home to his home in Arizona.2 36 Six truckloads of furniture, rugs, paintings,
and other household goods travelled westward before Doris realized that she
had been taken. Doris reported the thefts, which included $99,500 worth of
jewels, to law enforcement.237 Riccardi was convicted and sentenced to ten
years in prison.238
In 1949, Doris announced an auction of the furniture and furnishings
of her estate. 239 Doris hoped for proceeds of $75,000, but the auction
brought in only $39,000.240 The house and grounds were also put up for
sale.24'
3.

Her Death

Doris died of leukemia on August 13, 1963. She was seventy-four
242
years old and had no known survivors.

1954 and is now owned by a charitable organization dedicated to its preservation.
The Princess,supra note 228.
234. Princess Charges $99,500 Swindle, supra note 200, at 26. According
to the New York Times, Doris first met Mr. Riccardi when he visited her estate as a
prospective buyer in 1945. Id. This was the same year in which the Tax Court
rendered its decision in Farid,raising the possibility that Doris's finances were not
what they were during her marriage to S.S.
235. Riccardi had been arrested at least ten times prior to meeting Doris.
Id.; New York Locates 'Master Swindler,' N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1948, at 28
("arrested a dozen times"). He had been convicted of a stock swindle in New York in
1937 and had served three years in state prison before winning a retrial, which
prosecutors never initiated. He was enjoined from dealing in securities in New York.
He had been disbarred in California for embezzlement. Princess Charges $99,500
Swindle, supra note 200, at 26.
236. Princess Charges $99,500 Swindle, supra note 200, at 26.
237. Id.
238. Riccardi Gets 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1948, at 6.
239. Princess to Auction $75,000 Furnishings,supranote 233, at 36.
240. Princess' Auction Brings in $39,000, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1949, at
33.
241. ld Doris's obituary in the New York Times stated that she had been
sued in 1959 for $13,000 in bad debts and had paid with receipts from sales of art
and furniture. PrincessFarid-es-Sultaneh,supra note 232 at 31.
242. Princess Farid-es-Sultaneh,supra note 232, at 3 1.
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S.S.
1.

S.S. Marries Again

Only months after divorcing Doris, S.S. married again. On October
28, 1928, Mrs. Clara K. Swaine, a divorcee, became the third Mrs. Kresge in
a private ceremony. 243 Clara's age was given as thirty-four; S.S. was fiftyone at the time.244 The wedding took place at the home of Clara's mother in
Kunkletown, Pennsylvania, twenty-five miles from S.S.'s childhood home.24 5
Clara, however, had spent most of her life, and resided at the time, in New
York City. 246 Like Doris, Clara "was musically inclined., 247 "Friends of the
couple were not surprised at their marriage
because they have been seen
' 248
together a great deal during the past year."
Shortly after the wedding, the Methodist Episcopal conference
disciplined the pastor who performed the wedding ceremony. 249 The Church,
it seems, permitted marriage following divorce only if the ground was
unfaithfulness,250 which was not the case in either of S.S.'s divorces. The
minister was excused by the conference after apologizing for having failed to
investigate the circumstances of S.S.'s divorces. 5
S.S. led a quieter life with Clara than he had with Doris. They
resided in Mountainhome, Pennsylvania, near S.S.'s childhood home, and
later wintered in Miami. 252 Although S.S. remained active in the affairs 253
of
the Company and in other businesses, he rarely was in the public limelight.
2.

S.S. Focuses on His Work

S.S. stepped down as Company president in 1925,254 during his
marriage to Doris, but continued to serve as chairman until he was ninetyeight. He also continued, until that time, to serve as trustee of the Kresge
243. S.S. Kresge Marriesfor the Third Time, supra note 200, at 16.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. S.S. Kresge Marriesfor the Third Time, supra note 200, at 16.
249. Rebuked in Kresge Case, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 14, 1929, at 18; Pastor
Regrets Helping Kresge Wed; Absolved, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1929, at 3.
250. Pastor Regrets Helping Kresge, supra note 249, at 3; Will Inquire on
Kresge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1928, at 30.
251. Id; Rebuked in Kresge Case, supra at 249, at 18.
252. S.S. Kresge Dead; Merchant was 99, supra note 12, at 38.
253. Id.
254. During the 1920's, S.S. purchased an interest in Stern Brothers, a New
York department store, and The Fair, a store in Chicago. He later sold both. Id.
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Foundation, a philanthropic foundation he established in 1924
(coincidentally, perhaps, the same year in which he divorced his first wife
and married Doris) and to which he donated over $65 million.255 At the time
S.S. stepped down from both positions, in June of 1966, he was the oldest
chairman and the one with the longest tenure (fifty-three years) of any New
York Stock Exchange listed company. During his stewardship, the Company
launched Kmart discount stores. It operated 136 Kmarts at the time S.S.
resigned, as well as 673 Kresge 5-and-10-cent stores and 110 Jupiter stores.
In 1965, the Company's annual sales exceeded $851 million and its
employment force exceeded 42,000 people. The
Kresge Foundation gave
25 6
over $70 million in grants during the same years.
3.

His Death

S.S. was hospitalized in July 1966, shortly after stepping down from
his positions with the Company and the foundation. He died three months
later at the age of ninety-nine. His third wife, Clara, was at his bedside. In
addition to his wife, S.S. was survived by his five children from his first
257
marriage.
In an ironic twist, S.S. outlived both Doris and his life expectancy, as
quantified by the Second Circuit in Farid.To show that the marital property
rights exchanged by Doris had substantial value, the opinion noted S.S.'s net
worth and the value of his real estate holdings at the time of the marriage,
and to demonstrate the likelihood that Doris would predecease S.S., entitling
her to a share of that wealth if not for her exchange of marital property rights
for shares in the Company, the court specifically noted that Doris was thirtytwo years old when she married S.S., with a life expectancy of thirty-three
and three-fourths years (i.e., sixty-five and three-fourths) 258 and S.S. was
fifty-seven years old at the time, with a life expectancy of sixteen and onehalf (i.e., seventy-three and one-half).2 5 9 In fact, Doris died at the age of
seventy-five, predeceasing S.S.
4.

The Kresge Legacy

Over the strenuous objections of S.S.'s son, Stanley, the Company
changed its name to Kmart Corporation in 1977. 2660 In 1987, Kmart
255. S.S. Kresge Dead; Merchant was 99, supra note 12, at 38.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Farid11, 160 F.2d 812, 814 (2nd Cir. 1947).
259. Id.at 813.
260. Stanley Sebastian Kresge, 85, Retailer and Philanthropist,supra note

49, at D19.
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Corporation sold its remaining Kresge and Jupiter stores in the United States
to McCrory Stores, which discontinued the brand.26' (Ironically, John
McCrory had been S.S.'s partner when he opened his first stores). 262 Kmart

Corporation filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on January 22, 2002,263
emerging on May 6, 2003 as Kmart Holding Corporation.2 64 In 2005, Kmart
Holding purchased Sears, Roebuck and Company and changed its name to
Sears Holdings Corporation. 265 As a result, S.S.'s surname no longer is
reflected in either the corporate or store names.
The Kresge name continues to flourish in the philanthropic world.
S.S. funded the Kresge Foundation with an initial contribution, in 1924, of
$1.6 million and added an additional $60.5 during his lifetime.266 Today, the
Foundation holds assets of $3.1 billion and makes gifts far exceeding $100
million annually in each of seven areas: arts and culture, community
development, Detroit, education, environment, health, and human services.26 7
Five of S.S.'s descendants serve or have served on the Foundation's board of
trustees, carrying on S.S. Kresge's mandate to "promote human progress. 26 8

261. Company Briefs, N.Y.

TIMES,

Jun. 2, 1987, at 22; Barmash, A Kresge-

McCrory Reunion, supra note 42, at 33.

262. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
263. Danny Hakim & Leslie Kaufman, Kmart Files Bankruptcy, Largest
Everfor a Retailer,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at CI.
264. Constance L. Hays, A New Start, A New Name. But Have Things
Really Changed as Kmart Comes Out of Bankruptcy?, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2003, at

C9.
265. Kmart Completes Acquisition of Sears, N.Y.

TIMES,

Mar. 25, 2005, at

C3.
266. About Us, THE
(last visited Oct. 21, 2012).

KRESGE FOUNDATION,

http://www.kresge.org/about-us

267. Id.; see also Melia Tourangeau, Kresge Foundation, LEARNING TO

http://www.leamingtogive.org/papers/paper209.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2012) ("The Kresge Foundation has made incredible contributions to the fields of
medical research, higher education, health and human services, and the arts by
providing bricks and mortar support for non-profit organizations in need of new
facilities and equipment. If one were to go to virtually any large university, arts
organization, hospital or research institute around the country, chances are the
Kresge name would be somewhere.").
GIVE,

268. About Us, supra note 266.

